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One reason individuals will take second jobs is if faced with a combination of low wages 
and hours constraints in their primary job.  In this case the imposition of a minimum 
wage, such as recently introduced in Britain, might be expected to reduce the number of 
individuals in second jobs.  This paper uses difference-in-differences estimation on a 
panel of individuals matched across successive Labour Force Surveys to estimate the 
impact of the minimum wage, and subsequent upratings, on the incidence of second job 
holding. There is little evidence to suggest that the introduction of the minimum wage 
had a large effect on the incidence of second job working. 
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1.   Introduction 
Economic theory suggests that individuals take second jobs if the wage in the primary job 
is below the desired wage and if there are constraints on hours that prevent individuals 
from working more hours on the primary job to make up any income shortfall.  If some 
workers take second jobs because the hours/wage combination provided by the first job is 
low, then we might expect the imposition of a minimum wage to reduce the number of 
individuals in second jobs.  This is because, in the presence of hours constraints, the 
effect of a minimum wage would be to raise the offered wage closer to the desired wage, 
with the hours constraint in the first job restricting the substitution effect, so that the 
income effect dominates.  In this case, the optimal hours-wage combination moves closer 
to the hours-wage package provided in the primary job.  Other things equal, this should 
reduce the incidence of second jobs among low paid workers, specifically among those 
initially below the minimum wage.   
Britain introduced a national minimum wage, (NMW), in April 1999, which has 
since been subsequently uprated on an approximately yearly basis.  This effectively 
provides a quasi-natural experiment with which to analyse the impact of the minimum 
wage on second jobholders.  Individuals may also hold second jobs for reasons other than 
income constraints – labour in the two jobs may not be perfect substitutes, (Lilja (1991), 
Conway and Kimmell (1998) – and these other factors may also vary over time.  We 
therefore compare the change in circumstances of two groups of individuals – those 
affected by the minimum wage and those not over a period before and after the minimum 
wage was introduced.  The change in second job holding for those whose wages would 
have been raised to comply with the new minimum wage is compared with the change in   2 
the incidence of a control group - those earning just above the minimum when it was 
introduced.  Since the level of the NMW is different for youths compared to adults we 
analyse the changes among these groups separately. 
  There has been relatively little research on second job holding,
1 in part because 
of lack of data. Yet second job holding is an important issue in the debate as to whether 
individuals really are able to adjust their hours of work on the job in response to a change 
in wage rates. The existence of second job holding is harder to reconcile with the simple 
competitive labour supply model of unconstrained, flexible hours in the job. If firms have 
preferences for fixed working hours, then individuals may only be able to adjust hours 
following a wage change by moving to a different job.  This may be difficult if there are 
frictions imposed by costs of mobility and information gathering. Altonji and Paxson 
(1989) provide evidence for the United States that is supportive of this hypothesis, (see 
Robinson and Wadsworth (2004) for some UK evidence on hours constraints and hours 
changes following a wage shift). In this context, taking a second job could be viewed as 
one way of increasing hours of labour supplied without incurring all the costs of job 
change.
2  In what follows we also document the characteristics of individuals in, and 
firms most likely to provide, second jobs and how these characteristics have changed 
over time, around the advent of the NMW. 
 
                                                                   
1 See Paxson and Sichermand (1996), Conway and Kimmel (1998) and Bluestone and Rose (1998) for the 
most recent U.S. studies; Fredriksen, Gravesen and Smith, (2001) for Denmark; and Boheim and Taylor 
(2003) for Britain. 
 
2  There will of course be fixed costs associated with the take up of a second job. 
   3 
 
The National Minimum Wage and the Choice to Hold a Second Job 
A priori, the introduction of a decent minimum wage might be expected to reduce the 
number of individuals who hold two jobs.  For example, in Figure 1, an individual who 
supplies 35 hours of work a week at wage w0 would prefer to take up a second job for an 
extra 10 hours a week at the same wage.  However, if the wage rate improves to w1  , as a 
result of minimum wage legislation, the worker would cut hours and move to a higher 
level of utility on IC3 at 40 hours of work a week.  A characteristic of the British labour 
market is that second jobs command a wage premium (see Table 3).  In accordance with 
the diagram in the lower panel of Figure 1, a rise in the wage rate following the 
introduction of the NMW would enable a worker to reduce hours to 40 hours a week.  
Whether this did in fact occur in the advent of minimum wage legislation is the empirical 
matter we investigate here. 
Difference-in-differences 
The introduction of the NMW created a treatment effect of differing intensity across the 
working population.  Those workers whose pay was initially below the NMW received a 
larger pay rise than most people whose pay was above the NMW, (Figure A1 in the 
appendix confirms this).  The same applies, although to a lesser extent, for subsequent 
upratings of the NMW.  This enables us to assess how the introduction of the NMW 
altered the second job share for those below, and those above, the minimum wage.  By 
using difference-in-differences estimation we ensure that our results on multiple jobs are 
not biased by any unobservable fixed effects.     4 
We are interested in the probability that an individual i holds a second job at time t 
conditional on the wage category an individual belongs to in the primary job, 
  Pr(Twoit) = ai + gt + d* TREAT it            (1) 
where Twoi = 1 is observed for individual i if in a second job, = 0 otherwise, a is an 
individual specific time invariant fixed effect, g is a time effect common to all individuals 
at time t and TREATit is a dummy variable denoting whether the individual belonged to 
the treatment group – those initially below the NMW.  The unadjusted difference-in-
differences estimator, (DID), can be obtained simply by looking at the difference in the 
change in the sample probabilities of holding a second job of the treatment and control 










This estimate can be obtained by pooling data over successive time periods and running 
logit or probit estimation on the following: 
Pr(Twoit = 1 ) = F[a + b Treati + h Year99 + q Year99 * TREATi ]    (2) 
Year99 is a 1999 year dummy for the second year of observation – after the introduction 
of the NMW.  The term b reflects time-invariant second job differences.  The main 
coefficient of interest is q. The coefficient on the year and treatment interaction term 
gives the change in the second job holding differential over the period in which the NMW 
was introduced. This is the DID estimator and is given by the marginal effect from the 
probit/logit estimation of (2).  If the parameter q is negative, it shows that second job 
holding fell relative to the control group between 1998 and 1999 (or any subsequent 
uprating period), other things equal. The size of the coefficient tells us, in percentage 
points, by how much the differential between treatment and control group changed.   5 
Differencing in this way removes any unobservable individual/group specific fixed 
effects. As with all DID estimation this assumes that in the absence of the NMW the 
difference in the probability of holding a second job between treatment and control 
groups is the same in each period. It may of course be that the incidence of second jobs 
would develop differently over time for i ndividuals in different parts of the wage 
distribution. We can test this by examining whether there was a wage effect, before the 
intervention took place. If so, this suggests that there may have been differential trends in 
second job holding among different income groups regardless of the NMW. The DID 
approach also assumes that the wage taken in the primary job is not influenced by the 
probability of having a second job and that there are no differential employment effects 
on the number of primary jobs across groups following the NMW. In order to allow for 
observable differences between treatment and control group not captured by the time and 
treatment dummies, (2) is augmented with a set of controls that include both individual 
and job characteristics. The sensitivity of the DID estimates to variations in controls is 
explored below.  
The size of the treatment effect also varies across individuals for several other 
reasons. First, those furthest below the minimum receive a larger increase than those 
closer to the minimum. It seems important therefore to try and test for this possible 
differential effect in what follows by using distance from the minimum rather than a 
simple dummy variable as the central variable of concern. Second, those individuals with 
two jobs could, in theory, receive two treatments, since the NMW applies to both jobs. In 
practice, as the top panel of Table 3 shows, just 5% of those with a second job had both 
jobs paying initially below the NMW, though we allow the estimates to be sensitive to   6 
this concern. Finally, Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) replaced Family Credit (FC) 
in October 1999.  Both schemes are supplements to households in low paid work with 
children, bringing their income up to a guaranteed minimum threshold.  WFTC is more 
generous in both the level of minimum guaranteed income and the rate of supplement 
withdrawal.  However, it remains true that any household in receipt of FC (WFTC) would 
have received less benefit from the introduction, or uprating, of the NMW, since state 
benefits would have been reduced at the rate of 70 (55) pence for each 1£ increase in 
household income.  Given the presence of in-work benefits, eligible households would be 
less likely to take a second job, since much of the additional income would be offset by 
reduced welfare payments.  This suggests the need to try to distinguish between 
households in receipt of WFTC in what follows. 
 
2.   Labour Force Survey data 
  The LFS is a quarterly survey of around 60,000 households that extracts detailed 
information on individual characteristics and labour market status.  Each UK Labour 
Force Survey asks those in employment whether during the reference week they held an 
additional paid job other than that classified as the main job and that the individual had 
not changed jobs during the reference week.  The answers to these questions form the 
basis for the main variable of interest used in this study.  In order to facilitate the 
difference-in-differences estimation we use the longitudinal element of the LFS to match 
individuals over a period of one year.  In what follows we present aggregate estimates 
and separate estimates for men and women, youths and adults.  The sample is restricted, 
initially, to those in the treatment group and those in the control group whose wages lie   7 
just above the NMW in the main job and then estimated again over the full sample of 
employees.  All estimation is carried out on the sample of individuals in the working age 
population. 
  Individuals in the LFS are followed for 5 successive quarters within a rolling 
panel framework.  Since the spring of 1997, wage information has been ascertained on 
the 1
st and 5
th waves of the interview process.  It is the wage response from the 1
st wave 
that allows us to construct treatment and control groups.  To assess the initial impact of 
the NMW, we take all those in 1998 earning below the initial national minimum wage of 
£3.60 as the treatment group, some 9% of the sample of employees in 1998, and take 
those earning just above the minimum, between £3.60 and £4.20 – around 20% of all 
employees – for the control.  The labour market experience of this group is assumed to be 
closest to that of the treatment group.  We then create a residual third group that 
incorporates the remainder in the upper part of hourly wage distribution.
3  In what 
follows we assess the sensitivity of the results to changes in the composition of the 
control group and the sensitivity of the estimates to the construction of the hourly wage 
on which the treatment and control groups are defined.  One disadvantage that surrounds 
the LFS is that the hourly wage has to be derived for all employees before March 1999 
and for all salaried employees after this date.  This generates a degree of measurement 
error for one of the principal variables in this study: the variable is used to define the 
treatment and control groups for this study.  Stewart (2003) offers a potential solution to 
the problem – that involves matching those without an hourly wage to those with similar 
                                                                   
3  Stewart (2003) uses a similar strategy in his analysis of employment changes following the minimum 
wage.   8 
characteristics with an hourly wage.  Moreover, the only hours information for second 
jobs is total actual hours including overtime (paid or unpaid).  
  We therefore construct the hourly wage variable in both jobs by dividing actual 
weekly pay derived from the last pay received by actual hours worked in the reference 
week. Since we do have information on usual as well as actual hours worked for the main 
job, we test the sensitivity of the results to variations in the definition of the hourly wage 
in the main job in what follows. Figure A1 in the appendix does suggest however that the 
pattern of change in the hourly wage variables is consistent with what one would expect 
given the introduction of the NMW. The estimates from kernel regressions indicate that 
the percentage rise in wages, for job stayers, was indeed much larger for those initially 
below the NMW than for those above. Those furthest below the NMW also received the 
largest increase. 
  Around 9% of those with second jobs report working no hours in the second job 
during the reference week, but do report a weekly wage for the second job.4  This is 
because, as with the main job, the LFS obtains information on earnings relating to the last 
time an individual was paid and not specific to the reference week of the survey. We 
cannot therefore compute an hourly wage for this group, but retain the group in the data 
set to facilitate robustness tests. We also remove outliers from the data - those earning 
below 50p an hour and those earning above £1000 an hour from the data. All results 
should be interpreted accordingly. The LFS identifies individuals in receipt of any 
“family related benefits” in addition to child benefit. We use this variable to separate 
                                                                   
4 Around 11% of those with 1 job only also report zero hours worked in the reference week. 
   9 
individuals into those likely to be receiving in-work benefits and those not in order to 
allow further variation in the size of the treatment. 
 
3.   The Incidence of Second Jobs 
Around 4% of employees currently admit to having a second job, more than 
double the share observed in the late seventies, (Table 1). However, as Figure 2 shows, 
the second job share appears to have reached a peak of around 5% of all employees in 
1995 and has been falling steadily since then, that is, before the NMW was introduced.  
There are around twice as many women with a second job than men.   
Individuals working in the education, health, retail and financial sectors make up 
the majority of second job holders, (Table 2).  Health and education are particularly over-
represented in supplying more second job workers. This is because many second job 
holders are nurses, doctors or university teachers.  Cleaners and childcarers are also much 
more likely to be working in a second job. This dispersion in occupations is reflected in 
the distribution of wages in second jobs, (Table 3 and Figure 3). Hourly wages of second 
job holders are lower in both primary and second job compared to average hourly wages 
of single job holders.
5  Average hourly wages in second jobs appear higher than hourly 
wages in the primary job of second job holders.  The higher mean conceals the fact that, 
in 1998, 15% of all main jobs of two job holders paid below the minimum wage of £3.60 
compared to 26% of second jobs. The hourly wage in 52% of all second jobs is less than 
that in the primary job. Again, it is hard to reconcile this observation with the simple 
                                                                   
5  As Table 2 shows around one-quarter of the second jobs of employees are classified as self-employed. 
The LFS does not collect income information for self-employment.   10 
competitive model of unconstrained hours. It is easier to set this observation within a 
framework of income and hours constraints.  
Figure 3 also shows evidence of a pronounced spike in the distribution of hours 
worked at around 40 for those with one job only. This spike is less pronounced for hours 
worked in main jobs for those with two jobs, though this partly reflects the gender 
division of second job holders, (see Figures A2 and A3 in the appendix). Average usual 
hours worked by second jobholders in the primary job are some 25% lower than the 
average usually worked by single jobholders. The average second job is worked for 
around 10 hours a week. Fifty percent of all second jobs are worked for 8 hours or less 
and 75% of all second jobs last less than 12 hours. Hence, average total hours usually 
worked by second jobholders is around 3 hours more than that worked by single 
jobholders.  The distribution of total hours worked for 2
nd job holders is noticeably flatter 
than that for those with one job only, again consistent with the idea that hours flexibility 
can be achieved mainly across, rather than within, jobs. 
The reward for taking a second job is not the same across gender.  Unsurprisingly 
mean real hourly wages for women in second jobs are less than those for males and more 
women with two jobs are in low paid primary jobs compared to men. Despite working 
longer hours in total, average weekly earnings for those with two jobs are lower than 
average earnings, particularly among women.  
 
4.   Impact of the NMW across the wage distribution 
We would expect that, if the NMW were to have an effect on whether an individual 
takes a second job, it would have the greatest influence on men and women paid below 
the NMW before its introduction.  In order to investigate this, we split the sample   11 
according to the worker’s position in the 1998 wage distribution.  Figure 4 traces the 
share of second jobs conditional on the level of an individual’s hourly wage in 1998.  The 
two lines on the graph represent the share in 1998 and the share in 1999 conditional on 
the 1998 wage. The difference between the two lines gives the change in the second job 
share at each wage level over the period in which the minimum wage was introduced.
6 
The Figure confirms that the incidence of second job holding is higher the lower the 
hourly wage in the main job and highest of all for those below the level of the NMW.  
However, the change in second job holding over the period is quite small and there is 
little suggestion from the Figure that second job holding fell more for those below the 
NMW.  The same figure on the sub-sample of those without children, the group most 
likely to benefit from the NMW, shows a similar pattern in the lower panel.  
  Table 4 tests more formally for a minimum wage effect, giving the difference-in-
differences marginal effect estimates from a probit on the likelihood of having a second 
job.  The Table confirms the earlier results.7  Second job holding is higher among the low 
paid, but there is no statistically significant effect on the change in the probability of 
second job holding for those below the NMW relative to either the chosen control group 
or the rest of the sample of employees.  Table 5 repeats the exercise for different sub-
samples and for variations to the definition of control and treatment groups.  All 
specifications are reported without and with a full set of control variables (unadjusted and 
adjusted columns) as detailed above.  In most cases the difference-in-differences estimate 
is statistically insignificant. There is even some evidence of a rise in the proportion of 
                                                                   
6  The data are rounded to the nearest pound to smooth the graph. All those below £3.60 and above £3 are 
round to £3, all those between £3.60 and £3.99 are rounded to£4. 
 
7  We implicitly assume, for the time being, that hours used to construct the hourly wage are exogenous.   12 
second jobholders with no dependent children over this time. As an additional check, 
Table 6 reports the results of probit estimates of the probability that the second job will 
end conditional on the sub-sample of those with a second job before the NMW. Just 
under 50% of all those with a second job in 1998 no longer had a second job one year 
later.
8  However, Table 6 suggests that there is little evidence that the loss of a second job 
was correlated with the level of the hourly wage whether in the main or second job. 
  With little sign of any change in the incidence of second job working, we next 
examine whether there is any evidence that hours worked in second jobs changed over 
the period and whether there is any evidence that hours worked changed more for those 
affected by the NMW. We take the sub-set of all those with a second job before and after 
the NMW and run difference-in-differences estimation using number of hours worked in 
the second job as dependent variable. Again, subject to any concerns regarding division 
bias given the presence of a right hand side variable – below the NMW in the 2
nd job - 
that depends in part on the level of the left hand side variable, Table 7 suggests little 
evidence of any minimum wage effect on hours worked. 
 
5.   Conclusion 
The lower the (hourly) pay an individual receives, the more likely they are to have a 
second job. Using difference-in-differences estimation on a panel of individuals matched 
across successive Labour Force Surveys we do not find much evidence of a reduction in 
the proportion of second jobholders following the introduction of a mandatory minimum.  
Around 4 % of employees currently admit to having a second job with around twice as 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
8  Just 0.9% of those with only 1 job were not working one year later and 0.5% of those with a second job.   13 
many women holding two jobs as men.  Fifty per cent of second jobs are worked for 8 
hours or less.  The incidence of multiple job holding reached a peak in 1995, but we find 
it difficult to associate the subsequent downturn in the proportion of second job holders to 
the introduction of the minimum wage legislation.   14 
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Figure 1.   Labour Supply Effect of an Increase in NMW 
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Figure 4. Kernel Regression Estimates of Incidence of Second Jobs by Initial Hourly 
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Table 1.   Share of Employees with Second Jobs, 1979 – 2002 
  1979  1981  1985  1990  1995  1998    1999  2000  2001  2002 
All                       
Age 22+  1.8  2.1  3.2  4.1  4.8  4.3    4.3  3.9  3.8  3.8 
18-21  3.0  1.6  3.1  4.2  6.3  6.0    5.6  5.0  4.8  4.4 
Men                       
Age 22+  1.7  2.1  2.8  3.3  3.4  3.2    3.2  3.0  2.7  2.7 
18-21  2.9  1.3  2.5  3.4  4.4  4.5    4.2  3.4  3.5  3.3 
Women                       
Age 22+  1.8  2.2  3.7  5.0  6.3  5.4    5.5  5.0  5.0  5.0 
18-21  3.1  1.8  3.6  4.7  8.2  7.6    6.9  6.7  6.2  5.3 
Source: LFS. Standard errors of proportions around 0.05 for 22+ and 0.2 for 18-21 year olds. 
 
Table 2. Sectoral and Occupational Distribution of Second Job Holders (1998) 
  % of employees 








Female  50.7  65.5  Part-Time  24.2  46.2 
Age (years)  39.8  39.9  Temporary   6.4  11.8 
      Self-Employ    23.8 
Sector      Occupation     
Agriculture   1.3   1.0         Managers  16.1  11.8 
Manufacturing  20.5   9.3         Professions  11.1  17.2 
Energy   0.8   0.6         Ass. Prof.  10.1  12.3 
Construction   5.1   3.5         Clerical  16.8  15.1 
Retail  13.6  11.6        Skill Man.  9.8    5.1 
Hotels   3.5   4.0         Personal servs.  11.3  15.5 
Transport   6.7   4.4         Sales   6.9    6.1 
Finance  14.4   11.6      Other manual  17.8  16.9   
Public Admin.   7.3   7.2         Of which:     
Education   9.3  20.9      Medics  0.4  1.6 
Health  12.7  19.7        Univ. teachers  0.5  2.0 
Other services    4.9   6.2       Nurses  2.1  3.7 
      Firefighters  0.1  0.6 
      Childcare  0.9  2.5 
      Sales assist’nt  5.5  5.7 
      Cleaners  2.9  6.8 
   20 
Table 3.  Hours and Wages in Second Jobs and the NMW, 1998: Adults 22+   
  1 Job Only  2 Jobs 
Total    1
st Job  2
nd Job 
Hours       
Mean  36.9 (12.1)  29.3 (14.2)  10.1 (9.7) 
10th percentile  20  11  3 
50
th percentile  38  30  8 
90th percentile  50  46  20 
Hourly Wage       
Mean  8.40 (5.1)  6.60 (5.3)  7.80 (14.2) 
10
th percentile  3.80  3.40  2.70 
50
th percentile  7.00  6.00  4.80 
90th percentile  14.50  14.30  14.30 
% below £3.60  8.0  14.9  26.2 
% both below £3.60       4.7 
% 2
nd jobs pay < 1st          52.0 
Men       
Hours    1
st Job  2
nd Job 
Mean  43.0 (9.1)  39.9 (11.9)  11.1 (10.8) 
10th percentile  35  23  3 
50
th percentile  40  40  8 
90
th percentile  55  54  20 
Hourly Wage       
Mean  9.60 (5.6)  9.30 (6.1)  9.80 (23.4) 
10
th percentile  3.90  4.00  2.50 
50
th percentile  8.20  7.40  5.00 
90th percentile  16.40  17.30  16.70 
% below £3.60  4.0  6.0  25.9 
% both below £3.60       1.8 
% 2
nd jobs pay < 1st          58.6 
Women       
Hours    1
st Job  2
nd Job 
Mean  30.8 (11.3)  23.6 (11.8)  9.6 (9.1) 
10th percentile  15  10  2 
50
th percentile  35  22  8 
90
th percentile  42  40  18 
Hourly Wage       
Mean  7.10 (4.0)  6.70 (4.6)  7.30 (8.7) 
10th percentile  3.50  3.20  2.70 
50
th percentile  6.00  5.10  4.70 
90th percentile  12.40  12.2  13.80 
% below £3.60  12.1  19.6  26.4 
% both below £3.60       6.2 
% 2
nd jobs pay < 1st          49.7 
Note. 1. Source. Labour Force Survey matched panel.  2. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 4. Difference-in-Difference Estimates on Probability of 2nd Job 1998:1999 
  Treatment & Control only  Treatment, Control & Others 
  Unadjusted  Adjusted  Unadjusted  Adjusted 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Below NMW  0.011  0.009  0.035  0.018 
  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.006)**  (0.006)** 
Year1999  -0.007  -0.007  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
Below*Year1999  0.009  0.008  0.004  0.003 
  (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Near NMW      0.031  0.014 
      (0.006)*  (0.006)* 
Near*Year1999      -0.004  -0.003 
      (0.004)  (0.004) 
         
Observations  6839  6839  40648  40648 
Note. 1.  Standard errors adjusted for clustering in brackets. 2 ** notes significance at 5% level.   
3.  Industry, marital status, education, ethnicity, temporary job status, size of firm, job tenure, age of 
youngest child and number of dependent children also included in adjusted columns but results not 
reported.  4.  Dependent Variable: probability of having a second job in the reference week.  5.  Each year 
estimate runs from April to the following March respectively.  6. Sample: adults 22+ 
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Table 5.  Sensitivity of Difference-in-Difference Results to Different Specifications 
  Treatment & Control only  Treatment, Control & Others 
  Unadjusted  Adjusted  Unadjusted  Adjusted 
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(9) Men  0.012  0.011  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.018)  (0.015)  (0.009)  (0.008) 
(10) Women  0.008  0.006  0.007  0.006 
  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.007)  (0.006) 
         
All: 2










Notes. See Table 4. Coefficients are the estimates for the interaction of treatment and second sample year 
dummy variables for each reported sample. 
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Table 6. Probability of Stopping 2nd Job 1998-1999 
  Treatment & Control only  Treatment, Control & Others 
  Unadjusted  Adjusted  Unadjusted  Adjusted 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Below NMW  -0.005  -0.018  -0.036  -0.052 
  (0.061)  (0.065)  (0.047)  (0.051) 
Below NMW 2
nd Job  -0.014   0.005  -0.032  -0.047 
  (0.070)  (0.074)  (0.049)  (0.051) 
         
Observations  263  263  1062   1062 
Note. 1.  Robust standard errors in brackets. 2 ** notes significance at 5% level.  3.  Industry, marital status, 
education, ethnicity, temporary job status, size of firm, job tenure, age of youngest child and number of 
dependent children also included in adjusted columns but results not reported.  4.  Sample: adults 22+ with 
second jobs in 1st period. 5. Sample mean of dependent variable 0.436 in columns 1 & 2 and 0.465 in 
columns 3 & 4. 
. 
 
Table 7. Difference-in-Difference Estimates on Hours Worked in 2
nd Job 1998:1999 
  Treatment & Control only  Treatment, Control & Others 
  Unadjusted  Adjusted  Unadjusted  Adjusted 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Below NMW  -0.600  -0.525  -0.621  -0.665 
  (1.030)  (0.929)  (1.036)  (0.895) 
Year1999   0.138   0.282  -0.165  -0.084 
  (1.053)  (0.633)  (0.601)  (0.469) 
Below*Year1999  0.566  0.665  0.798  0.943 
  (1.457)  (1.081)  (1.465)  (0.964) 
2
nd Below NMW   4.324**   3.536**   4.304**   4.151** 
  (1.030)  (0.944)  (1.036)  (1.030) 
2
ndBelow*Year1999  -1.844  -1.975  -1.612  -1.759 
  (0.744)  (1.132)  (1.465)  (1.057) 
         
Observations  420  420  920    920 
Note. 1.  Standard errors adjusted for clustering in brackets. 2 ** notes significance at 5% level.   
3.  Industry, marital status, education, ethnicity, temporary job status, size of firm, job tenure, age of 
youngest child and number of dependent children also included in adjusted columns but results not 
reported.  4.  Sample: adults 22+ with second jobs in both periods.  24 
Appendix 
 
Table A1. Difference-in-Difference Estimates on Probability of 2nd Job 1998:1999 
(Youth sample: 18-21 year olds) 
  Treatment & Control only  Treatment, Control & Others 
  Unadjusted  Adjusted  Unadjusted  Adjusted 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Below NMW  0.003  -0.001  -0.016  -0.013 
  (0.047)  (0.039)  (0.024)  (0.021) 
Year1999  -0.026  -0.017  0.002  -0.002 
  (0.061)  (0.045)  (0.011)  (0.012) 
Below*Year1999  0.060  0.037  0.024  0.032 
  (0.084)  (0.059)  (0.036)  (0.040) 
Near NMW      -0.023  -0.012 
      (0.023)  (0.031) 
Near*Year1999      -0.007  -0.016 
      (0.045)  (0.044) 
         
Observations  274  274  1381  1381 
Note. 1.  Standard errors adjusted for clustering in brackets. 2.  ** notes significance at 5% level.   
3.  Industry, marital status, education, ethnicity, temporary job status, size of firm, job tenure, age of 
youngest child and number of dependent children also included in adjusted columns but results not 
reported.  4.  Dependent Variable: probability of being in a second job in the reference week.  5.  Each year 
estimate runs from April to the following March respectively.  
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Figure A1. % Change in Hourly Wage After Minimum Wage: Job Stayers 
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